

there was more. Individuals at all levels in Congress and in the Executive knew him. He was a good friend, had an engaging personality and a compelling range of speech. No one went to see him without returning to tell of some prescient observation by Lyndon Johnson, some amusing or slightly off-color metaphor.

Liking Johnson, politicians and other leaders aligned with him. All wanted the association preserved, so they did as Johnson commanded. We speak much of the power of personality; in Lyndon Johnson it was evident, effective and had its own distinctive style. Long before he became President, this was well recognized in the Congress. Asked after the 1960 Convention why he had chosen Lyndon Johnson as Vice-President, John F. Kennedy gave several reasons. The last and perhaps the decisive reason: "It wouldn't be worthwhile being President if Lyndon were Majority Leader." When President, Lyndon Johnson was effectively both. Kennedy, as I've said on other occasions, used less power than he had as President; Johnson used more.

I summarize: on civil rights and on poverty, the two truly urgent issues of the time, we had with Johnson one of the greatest changes of our time. I turn now to the historical correction which, along with others of my political faith, I need to make.

My association, even friendship, with Lyndon Johnson came to an end with the Vietnam war. We had intensely discussed it: Johnson's case was not unpersuasive. "Ken, you have no idea what the generals would be doing were I not here." And this, I must add, I did not know. Next year the Harvard University Press will publish "American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam War" by David Kaiser. It makes full, intelligent, even exhaustive use of newly declassified documents—all are now available except for some continuing and perhaps well-considered reticence by the CIA. Kaiser tells in extensive and, to this day, alarming detail of the military pressure on Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. The generals and their civilian acolytes took over, were even eager for a war. Nuclear weapons were freely proposed. One reads with relief and gratitude of the Presidential resistance, that of Kennedy in particular but also that of L.B.J. The widening military intervention was relentlessly pressed. And so the war and the deaths.

Knowing that part of the world from presence and experience, I knew that Communism was irrelevant in a primitive village and jungle economy—as Marx would have been the first to agree. There was also the irrelevance of our military establishment in the densely covered countryside that characterized much of Vietnam. The military forces of the Viet Cong would have been swept aside in a few days in Normandy. Here they could retreat conveniently and safely to the jungle, or even to the water-laden reaches of the Delta. Accordingly, I joined with others in opposition to this cruel and hopeless effort and to sending our youth, still under draft, to serve and die. In the political campaign of 1968, I was accorded a measure of leadership. I do not regret my effort against this error. One must, however, regret the way in which we allowed the Vietnam war to become the totally defining event of those years and likewise of the history. In the Johnson years it was the Vietnam war and nothing else. And so in the history it remains. Those of us who were involved allowed that response; at the time, perhaps it was inevitable. But certainly we have done far too little to correct the history since.

The needed correction is clear. In the Johnson years two major flaws in the Amer-

ican community and its polity were addressed. What was called the American democracy became in reality a democracy. All Americans became citizens. There was a long step toward peaceful coexistence between ethnic groups. And for the first time we had a clear recognition of the presence of deep, unforgiving poverty in this generally affluent land. The danger to domestic peace and harmony was recognized. Poverty, economic deprivation, is still with us. Income inequality is great and still growing. But recognition of this together with the belief that something can and must be done—that there can be remedial action—goes back to the Johnson years. And so does the range of action for the young, the poor, the ill and the old without which all would be much worse.

Three Presidents in our lifetime have seen the social need of their citizenry from their particular position in life. Franklin D. Roosevelt, as I've elsewhere said, saw the people of the United States as a tenantry stretching out from Hyde Park. For them and their depression hardship he had a landlord's responsibility. From Irish Boston, John F. Kennedy saw a great minority still seeking to escape—and his family had escaped—the trials and oppressions of a once beleaguered community. (It helped that it had become a political force.) Johnson's identification was with a larger, less easily identified, politically less powerful community—the widely distributed urban and rural poor. What Kennedy and his family had escaped, Johnson had experienced at first hand. (His personal encounter with rural privation was never understated.) The basic motivation of all three Presidents was the same: the sense of responsibility for a larger, less fortunate community within the range of actual observation and experience.

There is a final, greatly needed revision. We must accord much more emphasis to the dangerous, even insane military pressures to which Kennedy and Johnson were subject. We should note that these were especially strong in 1965, the time when Johnson's mind and effort were sharply focused on poverty and civil rights and the requisite legislation.

When we think of Vietnam, we must think much more of the generals (and associated civilians) who pressed powerfully for the war, for the risks of a greater war and for an opening for nuclear weapons. That, in the full light of history, there were presidential errors here cannot be doubted. We must, however, be grateful for what was resisted.

Thus the historical revision I seek, we must all seek. The initiatives of Lyndon Johnson on civil rights, voting rights and on economic and social deprivation and the responding role of the state must no longer be enshrouded by that war. Those of us who helped make the war central to the public attitude and politics of the time have a special responsibility here. That responsibility I would like to think I have partly assumed on this favored evening.

HOLD ON H.R. 2260

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, today I have notified the minority leader that I have placed a hold on H.R. 2260, the Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999. This legislation would negate Oregon's physician assisted suicide law which was debated and passed twice by the voters of Oregon.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to

the Senate by Mr. Thomas, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE RECEIVED DURING SINE DIE ADJOURNMENT

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

Under the authority of the order of the Senate of January 6, 1999, the Secretary of the Senate, on November 22, 1999, during the adjournment of the Senate, received a message from the House of Representatives, announcing that the Speaker has signed the following enrolled bill:

H.R. 3194. An act making consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000, and for other purposes.

Under the authority of the order of the Senate of January 6, 1999, the enrolled bill was signed on November 22, 1999, during the adjournment of the Senate by the President pro tempore (Mr. THURMOND).

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE RECEIVED DURING SINE DIE ADJOURNMENT

ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS SIGNED

Under the authority of the order of the Senate of January 6, 1999, the Secretary of the Senate, on November 29, 1999, during the adjournment of the Senate, received a message from the House of Representatives, announcing that the Speaker has signed the following enrolled bills and joint resolutions:

H.R. 15. An act to designate a portion of the Otay Mountain region of California as wilderness.

H.R. 449. An act to authorize the Gateway Visitor Center at Independence National Historical Park, and for other purposes.

H.R. 459. An act to extend the deadline under the Federal Power Act for FERC Project No. 9401, the Mt. Hope Waterpower Project.

H.R. 592. An act to designate a portion of Gateway National Recreational Area as "World War Veterans Park at Miller Field."

H.R. 658. An act to establish the Thomas Cole National Historic Site in the State of New York as an affiliated area of the National Park System.

H.R. 747. An act to protect the permanent trust funds of the State of Arizona from erosion due to inflation and modify the basis of which distributions are made from those funds.

H.R. 748. An act to amend the Act that established the Keweenaw National Historical Park to require the Secretary of the Interior to consider nominees of various local interests in appointing members of the Keweenaw National Historical Park Advisory Commission.